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Visual categorization appears both effortless and virtually instantaneous. The study by
Thorpe et al. (1996) was the ﬁrst to estimate the processing time necessary to perform
fast visual categorization of animals in brieﬂy ﬂashed (20ms) natural photographs. They
observed a large differential EEG activity between target and distracter correct trials that
developed from 150ms after stimulus onset, a value that was later shown to be even
shorter in monkeys!With such strong processing time constraints, it was difﬁcult to escape
the conclusion that rapid visual categorization was relying on massively parallel, essentially
feed-forward processing of visual information. Since 1996, we have conducted a large
number of studies to determine the characteristics and limits of fast visual categorization.
The present chapter will review some of the main results obtained. I will argue that rapid
object categorizations in natural scenes can be done without focused attention and are
most likely based on coarse and unconscious visual representations activated with the
ﬁrst available (magnocellular) visual information. Fast visual processing proved efﬁcient for
the categorization of large superordinate object or scene categories, but shows its lim-
its when more detailed basic representations are required. The representations for basic
objects (dogs, cars) or scenes (mountain or sea landscapes) need additional processing
time to be activated. This ﬁnding is at odds with the widely accepted idea that such basic
representations are at the entry level of the system. Interestingly, focused attention is still
not required to perform these time consuming basic categorizations. Finally we will show
that object and context processing can interact very early in an ascending wave of visual
information processing. We will discuss how such data could result from our experience
with a highly structured and predictable surrounding world that shaped neuronal visual
selectivity.
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INTRODUCTION
How long does it take to process a natural scene? What kind of
visual information can be extracted from a natural stimulus in the
ﬁrst few hundred milliseconds? How fast are the complex cognitive
operations required for object categorization at different levels? Is
there a hierarchical organization from detection to ﬁne categoriza-
tion? In the last two decades a large debate has engaged about such
questions and is far from ﬁnding an end.
Visual categorization is a fascinating cognitive operation. The
categorization of mammals, ﬁsh, birds, insects, or snakes into an
“animal” category implies the grouping of objects despite very
large physical differences. Moreover categorization can be made
at different levels from the largest categories such as animal to
the recognition of a “single item.” An animal can be a dog, a
greyhound, an afghan greyhound, or even Toby, my own afghan
greyhound. Although such processing appears both effortless and
virtually instantaneous in our daily life, the relative processing
time necessary to complete such “cognitive” operations at dif-
ferent levels and the underlying cerebral mechanisms are still to
determined.
How we move gaze to explore natural scenes has been sub-
ject of interest since the 1930s (Buswell, 1935). Yarbus’s (1961)
classic study on the ocular scanning of a scene showed that we
typically make about three saccades a second, implying that a few
hundred milliseconds is enough for visual analysis at ﬁxation and
for programming the next eye movement. A decade later, both
Molly Potter (Potter and Levy, 1969; Potter, 1976) and Biederman
(1972) showed that we could extract the gist of a scene from brieﬂy
glimpsed scenes, even at presentation rates of around 10 frames/s,
although more processing time is needed to memorize pictures.
But considering the massive parallelism in visual processing, var-
ious scenes could be processed simultaneously within different
cortical areas and such studies do not really “time” the underlying
processing.
Behavior is probably an unquestionable way to determine pro-
cessing speed. If a reliable behavioral response to speciﬁc categories
of stimuli can be performed with a particular ﬂoor latency, one can
only conclude that the input–output loop can be completed in that
time on at least some of the trials. The study byThorpe et al. (1996)
was the ﬁrst to give a direct estimate of the processing time neces-
sary to perform fast visual categorizations. Subjects were required
to perform an “animal/non-animal” go/no-go categorization task
as fast and as accurately as possible when presented with natural
scenes that were ﬂashed for only 20 ms to prevent any exploratory
eye movements but left unmasked. The authors showed that the
earliest behavioral responses could be produced in under 300 ms
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and that a large differential EEG activity between correct target
and distracter trials developed from 150 ms after stimulus onset.
For the ﬁrst time it was possible to put a value on the shortest pro-
cessing time needed to perform a rapid visual categorization task.
The strong temporal constraint set by the short 150 ms latency
of the differential EEG activity led to the straightforward conclu-
sion that when producing their fastest responses, subjects must
be primarily relying on the ﬁrst massively parallel and essentially
feed-forward sweep of activity through the ventral visual pathway.
Indeed, object categorization presumably relies on the processing
of visual information involving all the visual areas (V1-V2-V4-
PIT-AIT) along the ventral pathway (Thorpe and Fabre-Thorpe,
2001, 2003), and processing in each cortical area almost certainly
involves more than one layer of synapses with time devoted to
axonal conduction and synapse integration (Nowak and Bullier,
1997; Girard et al., 2001).
Since 1996, a large number of studies have been conducted by
different groups, both in humans and monkeys, to determine the
different characteristics of visual categorization and fast visual pro-
cessing. Iwill review someof these studies and argue that fast visual
processing has got limits because it is most likely based on coarse
and unconscious visual representations automatically activated by
the ﬁrst available “magnocellular” information and that for such
fast functioning, the visual system has been shaped by experience,
extracting, and using the regularities of the surrounding visual
world.
A VERY ROBUST “MINIMAL REACTION TIME”
In the Thorpe et al. (1996) paper, the notion of “minimal reac-
tion time” (MinRT) in fast visual categorization was not yet made
explicit. It is clear that very early behavioral responses can be
anticipatory or can rely on “bets” made by the subjects. In fact
the go/no-go rapid categorization task is a good task to overcome
such problems. Since targets and distracters were equiprobable, all
anticipatory responses should be equally distributed on target and
distracter trials. As a result the MinRT can be deﬁned as the ﬁrst
time bin for which correct responses start to signiﬁcantly outnum-
ber incorrect responses (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998; VanRullen and
Thorpe, 2001a). At such latencies, the processing must be com-
pleted, at least in some cases, and this value can be considered as a
ﬂoor limit for an input–output loop in the task at hand.
The fact is that this MinRT appears very robust to different
types of object categories. Indeed animals can be considered as
a very special object category: they are very biologically perti-
nent and evolution might have developed hardwired systems to
deal with stimuli that could be life threatening as for predators
(New et al., 2007). It was thus crucial to demonstrate whether
this optimal processing could be seen for object categories that
appeared more recently in our evolutionary history and for which
only life-time experience could be involved. This demonstration
was done by comparing fast visual categorization for animals and
vehicles (VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001a) and showed that reaction
time distributions were statistically indistinguishable in particu-
lar when focusing on early responses. Furthermore, MinRT could
be evaluated at 250 ms arguing strongly that at least on some tri-
als, the entire visuo-motor sequence (visual processing, decision
process, and motor output) could be completed within this short
temporal window. In that study, the MinRT was particularly short,
but 250–290 ms appears as a value widely found for human sub-
jects categorizing superordinate object classes. This is indeed the
case when participants are required to categorize visual scenes as
being natural or artiﬁcial (Joubert et al., 2007), or to categorize
human being from animals (Rousselet et al., 2003). MinRT of
260 ms were also reported when subjects were required to ran-
domly categorize a single image or two simultaneously ﬂashed
images (Rousselet et al., 2002).
Interestingly this MinRT is no shorter for classes of stimuli for
which the literature might have predicted an advantage such as
simple forms: squares vs. circle (Aubertin et al., 1999) or even for
human faces among animal faces (Rousselet et al., 2003).
It might thus be that this value corresponds to a ﬂoor effect
observed in each study because of some stimuli in the set that
are so trivial to process that optimal processing speed is always
reached (a single animal, in canonical view, well segregated on a
uniform background for example). Optimal RTs could also have
been expected in response to the presentation of a threatening
animal (Ohman et al., 2001; Lobue and DeLoache, 2008). The
ﬁrst possibility was ruled out by tracking the effect of familiarity
on fast categorization tasks (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001). Exten-
sive training with a given set of natural scenes did not result in
any processing speed increase for behavioral responses triggered
before 360 ms (Figure 1). A training effect was observed for a
set of “difﬁcult stimuli” that could be evidenced because they
induced more errors and long RTs when a correct go-response
was produced. On the other hand whereas such a set of “difﬁ-
cult stimuli” could be clearly extracted, no set of “easy stimuli”
could be demonstrated. But the distribution of images categorized
with short RTs ﬁtted exactly the prediction of a random distrib-
ution over the RT range, so that there was no evidence that some
“trivial” stimuli were associated with particularly fast responses.
The only evidence that we ever found was in favor of threaten-
ing animals (Delorme et al., 2010). Reptiles were categorized with
faster median RTs but this effect was only global and could not
be observed for behavioral responses produced at latencies earlier
than about 340 ms.
The robustness of the MinRTs in most of the above studies was
corroborated by the associated EEG recordings. Indeed the large
differential EEG activity between target and distracter correct tri-
als recorded over frontal and occipital sites developed at the same
latency for animals or vehicles (VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001b), for
familiar vs. novel stimuli (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001) and for one
vs. two processed images (Rousselet et al., 2002).
Obviously, trying to optimize the top down presetting of the
visual system by increasing the subjects familiarity with a set of
pictures was not enough to increase processing speed. To investi-
gate further how top down knowledge could inﬂuence the visual
analysis of natural scenes, another go/no-go task required humans
to categorize a single speciﬁc learned natural scene among a vari-
ety of different non-target other natural photographs seen for the
ﬁrst time. In this study (Delorme et al., 2004), maximal top down
control could be used to “preset” all neurons selective for fea-
tures diagnostic of the single target–scene. This was indeed the
ﬁrst time (Figure 1) that we found a decrease of MinRT (220 ms
in the single target–scene task vs. 260 ms in a animal/non-animal
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FIGURE 1 | Overall reaction time distribution of go-responses
expressed in milliseconds and percentage of total go-responses using
10ms time bins. In shaded gray and thin lines the results from the fast
animal go/no-go categorization task. Top traces correct go-responses,
bottom traces incorrect go-responses (false alarms). Comparison is made
with the detection of a single target–scene (on the left) and with the same
task using familiar images: images on which subjects had been daily
trained for 3weeks (on the right). Differential EEG activity between correct
go and no go trials is shown for each of the two conditions in the
corresponding insert using the grand average (14 subjects) obtained on
electrode FZ. Data from Delorme et al. (2004) and from Fabre-Thorpe et al.
(2001).
categorization task). Note also that this study shows that detecting
a speciﬁc scene is faster than categorizing a scene.
If familiarity does not affect the MinRT by inducing an increase
in processing speed, one might expect that longer RT latencies for
early responses could be observed with unusual presentations such
as inverted or rotated stimuli. There again, the robustness of this
MinRT is astonishing. MinRT was only found to be delayed (by
10–20 ms) for inverted vs. upright human faces. No impact on
fast processing speed could be demonstrated in the processing of
inverted humans, animal faces, and animals even when they were
presented in all possible orientations (Guyonneau et al., 2006).
Finally, the MinRT value is dependent of the species stud-
ied. Humans are not the only species able to perform a fast
animal visual categorization task of natural photographs. Other
non-human primates such as baboons, macaques, and even mar-
mosets can categorize natural scenes depending on the presence
of an exemplar object belonging to a given target category such as
persons, animals, birds, trees. . . (Roberts and Mazmanian, 1988;
Fabre-Thorpe et al., 1998;Vogels, 1999; Martin-Malivel and Fagot,
2001; Minamimoto et al., 2010). Using the same fast go/no-go
animal categorization task with brieﬂy ﬂashed unmasked pictures
that was used in humans, monkeys’ accuracy scores are slightly
lower than humans (90 vs. 94%) but the speed of response is much
faster! Median RTs observed in monkeys can be 100–200 ms faster
than for humans and MinRT for monkeys are observed at 180 ms
(Figure 2). As a lot is known about the functional anatomy of the
monkey visual system and the neuronal response latencies in corti-
cal areas along the ventral visual pathway, the temporal constraints
set by this MinRT emphasize the role played by the ﬁrst feed-
forward wave of processing (Thorpe and Fabre-Thorpe, 2001) in
fast visual tasks. Conduction speed being fairly slow between cor-
tical areas and even slowerwithin different layers of a given cortical
area, the difference in response speed could simply be explained
by the relative brain sizes of humans and monkeys.
FIGURE 2 | Overall reaction time distribution of go-responses
expressed in milliseconds and number of go-responses using 10ms
time bins. Human performance (shaded distributions) and monkey
performance (empty traces) are shown in an animal/non-animal
categorization task. Top traces: correct go-responses, bottom traces:
incorrect go-responses (false alarms). Data from Fabre-Thorpe et al. (1998)
and Delorme et al. (2000).
All the results obtained in the above mentioned studies empha-
size that a minimum processing time cannot be shortened in fast
visual categorization tasks even when processing stimuli – such
as human faces – that are claimed to have a very special status
because they could depend upon a speciﬁc module of processing
or when processing the gist of a scene that could rely on global sta-
tistics of the photographs (Oliva, 2005; Oliva and Torralba, 2006).
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To ﬁt with such temporal constraints and reach optimal process-
ing speed the visual system might rely on the ﬁrst available visual
information. This issue is considered in the next paragraph.
FAST VISUAL PROCESSING: A ROLE FOR THE
MAGNOCELLULAR PATHWAY?
Visual information captured by retinal cells can reach cortical area
V1 using either the magnocellular (M) system or the parvocel-
lular (P) system. Traditionally, the M system has been associated
with the dorsal visual stream and the extraction of structure from
motion whereas the P system is associated with the ventral visual
stream and with the ﬁne analysis of static images. However this is
an oversimpliﬁcation as the M stream is also present in the ventral
pathway and might even account for as much as half of the visual
ventral information (Ferrera et al., 1992; Nealey and Maunsell,
1994). Visual information in the P stream reaches the visual cor-
tex roughly 20 ms after M based information (Nowak et al., 1995;
Nowak and Bullier, 1997) a temporal delay which means that if
the visual system uses the ﬁrst available information it has to rely
on the magnocellular stream.
To disentangle the relative role of the two streams in fast visual
categorization we have to rely on characteristics that are speciﬁc to
either the M or the P pathway. For example, the P stream transmits
chromatic information whereas the M information is motion and
luminance based. In addition, the different visual pathways have
different contrast sensitivities. Retinal and lateral geniculate parvo-
cellular cells stop responding for contrast thresholds much higher
than magnocellular cells (Kaplan and Shapley, 1986). Finally,mag-
nocellular ganglion cells in the macaque retina are eight times less
densely packed than parvocellular cells (Silveira and Perry, 1991),
with more convergence from photoreceptors (Dacey and Petersen,
1992), so that magnocellular spatial resolution is relatively poor.
Together, all these differences between the M and P pathways
allow predictions to be made and tested. If based on ﬁrst avail-
able visual information, ultra-rapid categorization should rely
on magnocellular object representations that will be very coarse,
color-blind, and robust to contrast reductions. Indeed in everyday
life, there are many conditions where visual conditions are often
far from being optimal. Luminance and contrast can be very low,
at dusk and dawn for example, and conditions might not always
allow the processing of colors. However, even when facing such
challenging everyday conditions our visual system still appears to
perform very efﬁciently and without effort. The series of studies
that were conducted both in humans and in monkeys were able to
provide convincing arguments for all the above predictions.
FAST VISUAL CATEGORIZATION IS BASED ON ACHROMATIC OBJECT
REPRESENTATIONS
Color has been shown to enhance recognition memory by con-
ferring an advantage during encoding an retrieval in recognition
memory paradigms such as delayed match to sample tasks of nat-
ural scenes (Gegenfurtner andRieger,2000;Wichmannet al., 2002;
Spence et al., 2006). On the other hand we found that color had
virtually no role in fast visual categorization tasks (Delorme et al.,
2000, 2010). Indeed when monkeys or humans were performing a
go/no-go animal/non-animal categorization task with a set of new
natural scenes that could appear randomly in color or in black
and white, no difference could be seen in response accuracy or
speed of early responses. An inﬂuence of color is observed later,
for responses with latencies over 325–400 ms.
Indeed, color could be used in later stage of processing (Yao
and Einhauser, 2008; Elder and Velisavljevic, 2009). Colors could
be used when diagnostic for the task at hand (Oliva and Schyns,
2000). They can even be used in very early processing, for example,
in the task using a single target–scene described earlier (Delorme
et al., 2004), spots of color were used by subjects when color was
diagnostic of the target–scene.
The study by Delorme et al. (2000) showed that the early
responses in fast visual object categorization task rely on achro-
matic representation of objects and thus provides a ﬁrst argument
in favor of a predominant role for magnocellular information to
explain the fastest behavioral responses. The goal of the second
series of studies discussed next and conducted in both humans
and monkeys was to evaluate the robustness of fast visual catego-
rization in challenging situations for the visual system when the
contrast of achromatic images was dramatically reduced.
FAST VISUAL CATEGORIZATION IS VERY ROBUST AT VERY LOW
CONTRAST
Here, the rational was to use the different contrast sensitivities
of the M and P pathways. At very low residual contrasts, the
parvocellular information is no longer available and the level
of performance should only rely on magnocellular information.
Both humans and monkeys were tested with achromatic images in
which the original contrast of each scene was reduced by a factor
of 2, 4, 8, 10, 16, or 32. This contrast reduction was done with mean
luminance of the image kept constant and corresponded to a divi-
sion of the SD of the pixel luminance values. If fast categorization
relies only on parvocellular information, a drop of performance
must suddenly appear when local contrast is below the parvocellu-
lar threshold (a value reported at 10% when calculated with black
and white gratings). But performance was surprisingly robust in
monkeys (Macé et al., 2010) and humans (Macé et al., 2005) that
both showed a very similar progressive performance drop with
decreasing contrasts (Figure 3). When 10% of the original con-
trast of the photographswas reached, thuswell under the threshold
of the parvocellular cells, performance was still at 70% correct and
chance level was only observed when the original contrast was
further divided by a factor of 32 (i.e., when photographs only
contained 3% of the original contrast). At very low contrasts,
performance has to rely only on the contrast sensitive magno-
cellular pathway and the robust performance evidenced both in
humans and monkeys argue again for a strong contribution of the
fast achromaticmagnocellular information in rapid categorization
tasks.
FAST VISUAL CATEGORIZATION AT THE CORNER OF THE EYE
Compared to parvocellular spatial resolution, magnocellular spa-
tial resolution is relatively poor. Extrafoveal vision has a low
spatial resolution and as a consequence, it is usually assumed that
peripheral vision is inappropriate for object recognition. Indeed
in everyday life when an object appears in far periphery we usu-
ally make a succession of eye movements to bring it in foveal
vision. But what kind of decision can we take when forced to rely
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FIGURE 3 | Categorization accuracy (T for animal target and D
for non-animal distracters) is robust to reduction of contrast.
Around 94% correct with the original black and white image
(considered as 100% contrast) accuracy was still around 70% with
only 10% residual contrast for both humans (in red) and monkeys (in
blue). Chance level (50%) was reached for both human and
monkeys when only 3% of the initial contrast was preserved
(adapted from Macé et al., 2010).
on peripheral vision? Whereas most studies investigated differ-
ences between central and peripheral vision in the processing of
simple physical features such as contrast, size, spatial frequencies,
phase, and texture discrimination, very few aimed at determin-
ing the abilities of peripheral vision in object recognition. There
again, human performance levels are surprising (Thorpe et al.,
2001). Subjects were required to perform an animal/non-animal
fast visual categorization task. They looked straight ahead a ﬁxa-
tion cross and large natural scenes were randomly ﬂashed in nine
positions virtually covering the whole horizontal visual ﬁeld. The
most peripheral scenes were centered at 57˚ and 70˚ and no effort
was done to adjust the scaling of the image. Subjects were able to
score respectively over 70 and 60% correct at these far eccentric-
ities. The results demonstrate that high-level visual tasks such as
object categorization can be performed from low spatial resolution
information provided by the peripheral retina.
In that study, as for stimuli ﬂashed with strong contrast reduc-
tions, the subjects were reporting that they were only guessing and
would certainly not be able to report the animal that was pre-
sented suggesting that object representations were not accessible
to consciousness (Boucart et al., 2010).
AN UNDERESTIMATED ROLE FOR THE MAGNOCELLULAR STREAM IN
OBJECT PROCESSING
Back in the 80s, Sherman (1985) proposed that the parvocellular
stream could provide high acuity descriptions to a coarse magno-
cellularly driven form of vision. But there are only a few studies
that have explicitly considered suchhypotheses (Kruger et al.,1988;
Strasburger and Rentschler, 1996; Bullier, 2001; Macé et al., 2005,
2010). Neuronal responses provide arguments supporting early
coarse information followed by more detailed object description.
Indeed, Sugase et al. (1999) showed a biphasic response of IT
neurons to faces with a ﬁrst phasic component related to face
recognition and a second late tonic component related to ﬁner
computations about facial characteristics (such as its expression).
Some authors have proposed an inﬂuence of magnocellular infor-
mation through projections of the dorsal visual cortical pathway
over the ventral pathway (Vidyasagar, 1999; Bullier, 2001). How-
ever, as noted above, magnocellular projections might account
for as much as half of the information in the ventral pathway.
What we would propose is a rapid preprocessing of magnocellular
inputs within the ventral pathway that would be able to guide, in
an intelligent way, and through rapid short feed-back loops, the
detailed visual processing of the slower parvocellular information
(Figure 4).
The object representations built from early coarse magnocellu-
lar information might be sufﬁcient to allow some forms of object
categorization such as to detect an animal, a vehicle, a person, or
a face in an image but may not be sufﬁcient for ﬁner discrimina-
tions. In that case, the processing time for a more restricted basic
category of animals such as dogs or birds may need more infor-
mation uptake and longer processing times; a prediction that is at
odds with the widely accepted idea that basic representations are
accessed ﬁrst.
FROM SUPERORDINATE TO BASIC CATEGORIES: A LIMIT TO
FAST VISUAL PROCESSING
As mentioned in the introduction, an object can be categorized
at different levels: superordinate (animal, vehicle), basic (a dog, a
car), subordinate level (a greyhound, a sports car), and even as a
“unique item”Toby,my own afghan greyhound, or my Ferrari. The
very predominant view is that the fastest level to be accessed is the
basic level (Rosch et al., 1976). This view was further reﬁned by
Jolicoeur et al. (1984)who reported that some atypicalmembers of
basic level categories could be categorized faster at the subordinate
level (ostrich vs. bird). More processing time would be needed for
accessing large abstract superordinate categories or more detailed
subordinate categories (Kosslyn et al., 1995; Jolicoeur et al., 1984;
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FIGURE 4 | A first wave of coarse achromatic magnocellular
information (in blue) would first reach high-level cortical areas of the
visual ventral pathways. At each step fast short feed-back loops (in black)
could be used for guiding – in an intelligent way – the parvocellular
information arriving with a temporal lag of about 20ms. From Macé (2006)
with permission.
Palmeri and Gauthier, 2004 for a review). But expertise can also
play a role as experts can access both subordinate and basic cat-
egory level at similar latencies (Tanaka and Taylor, 1991; Tanaka
and Curran, 2001).
Given the temporal constraints set with fast visual categoriza-
tion tasks using large superordinate categories, it seems difﬁcult to
predict even shorter MinRT for basic categories. To investigate the
processing time necessary at the basic level of categorization, sub-
jects were asked to perform rapid visual go/no-go categorization
tasks using three different types of targets: animal (superordinate)
and dogs or birds (basic levels). Natural images can induce biases
so that we made sure that the performance in accuracy and speed
on birds and dogs pictures when categorized at the superordinate
“animal” level was similar to the values seen with other animals.
The results of the study were really clear (Macé et al., 2009). To
produce a correct go-response to a bird- or a dog-target an addi-
tional 40–65 ms of mean processing time was required (Figure 5).
The whole reaction time distribution of correct go-responses was
shifted toward longer latencies so that MinRT was also increased
by 40–50 ms.
There is a large debate on the time needed to reach basic
level object representation. Grill-Spector and Kanwisher (2005)
claimed that “As soon as you know it is there, you know what it
is,” but subsequent studies claimed the contrary “Sometimes you
know it is there before you know what it is” (Mack et al., 2008;
Mack and Palmeri, 2010a), and “Detecting objects is easier than
categorizing them” (Bowers and Jones, 2008). But when address-
ing categorization at the basic level, the nature of the distracter
images is crucial in determining whether basic level categorization
is truly required. As pointed out by Mack and Palmeri (2010a),
the target vs. non-target tasks used by Grill-Spector and Kan-
wisher (2005) could sometimes be solved at the superordinate level
FIGURE 5 | Overall reaction time distribution of go-responses
expressed in milliseconds and percentage of total go-responses using
10ms time bins. Top traces correct go-responses, bottom traces incorrect
go-responses. Comparison is made between the fast superordinate animal
go/no-go categorization task (in black) and a fast basic “bird” categorization
task (in gray). The insert compares the result obtained in the fast
superordinate animal go/no-go categorization task when considering
separately birds photographs (gray dotted line) and other non-birds animals
(in black) showing that the two sets of images have similar difﬁculties when
categorized at the superordinate level. Adapted from Macé et al. (2009).
(faces/cars for example). Even when the non-target images came
from the same superordinate category they were restricted to very
dissimilar non-target exemplars. Thus when dogs were targets the
non-target images from the superordinate category were restricted
to ﬁsh and birds – no other quadrupeds were used. In contrast,
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Bowers and Jones (2008) used cats and dogs that are visually very
much more similar In both cases dogs have to be categorized at
the basic level because the non-target images are exemplars of the
same superordinate category (animals), but the difﬁculty of the
task is manipulated by mixing the dog targets among very dissim-
ilar (birds, ﬁsh) or very similar (cats) non-target animals. In our
2009 study, we made sure that the non-target animals were very
varied and found that categorization errors were biased toward
more similar animals. With bird targets, errors were often made
toward ﬁsh. In contrast, when dog were targets, errors were biased
toward quadrupeds and mainly toward wolves, foxes, and bears.
The result of basic level categorization of birds and dogs among
a very varied selection of distracters in the animal kingdom was a
clear shift in response latencies toward longer RTs.
When comparing superordinate and basic level in our study
(Macé et al., 2009), animal-targets were presented among non-
animal scenes, dog- and bird-targets among 50% non-animal
scenes, and 50% other non-target animals of all kinds. But, what
would happen to the processing time needed to reach basic
level representation if the proportion of distracters containing
a non-target animal dropped to 0%? In such case, we are back
to a superordinate contrast (Bowers and Jones, 2008; Mack and
Palmeri, 2010). Furthermore, the “target space” is restricted to
“dogs” with the result that top down presetting can be maximal.
In such conditions, we could expect the earliest responses to be
triggered with shorter MinRTs and possibly ﬁnd an advantage for
the basic category. But when contrasting dogs with non-animal
scenes, the results failed again to show any speed advantage at
the basic level, emphasizing again the robustness of the MinRT
value for object categorization. Basic dog categorization was per-
formed with higher accuracy when compared to superordinate
animal categorization (signiﬁcant difference of about 4% correct)
but median or MinRT values were strikingly similar. Even in such
conditions, a basic level category is not accessed faster than its
superordinate but at a similar latency (Macé et al., 2009).
The additional processing timeneeded to access basic level cate-
gories was also reproduced using scene gist categorization. Natural
or man made superordinate scene categories were accessed much
faster than basic level scene categories such as sea, mountains,
street, or indoor scenes (Joubert et al., 2007). It is worth noticing
that scene categorization (Natural/Man made) was not performed
any faster than object categorization at the superordinate level
(animal, vehicle. . .). Indeed various studies have suggested that a
coarse lay-out of the scene could be available before object recog-
nition takes place (Schyns and Oliva, 1994; Oliva and Torralba,
2001). The results obtained in our study argue more for a parallel
processing of scene and object.
Some other recent studies also support the view of a faster
access to superordinate coarse categories. The richness of our per-
ception when we glance at a grayscale photograph of a natural
scene was tested when the photograph was masked after a variable
(27–500 ms) delay (Fei-Fei et al., 2007). Subjects were asked to
report with accuracy what they had seen. “Animals” were reliably
reported with shorter image presentations than “birds,” “dogs,”
or “cats”; “vehicles” were reported before “cars”; “natural” and
“man made” scenes were reported before “mountains,” “forest,”
or “urban” scenes. The same temporal succession is found at the
cerebral level, Martinovic et al. (2008) found that early (around
100 ms) synchronizations in brain activity might be sufﬁcient for
superordinate representation of objects in scenes, whereas entry
level categorization would depend upon later (200–400 ms) brain
activity.
These results are at odds with the predominant view that states
basic category levels as special and accessed before superordi-
nate or subordinate representations. How can we explain the clear
advantage found for superordinate categories in fast categorization
tasks?
One explanation might lie in the kind of task used in the differ-
ent studies. The primacy of basic level categories has been reported
in numerous studies involving naming tasks and veriﬁcation tasks.
In a veriﬁcation task participants are ﬁrst shown a category label
(“animal,”“dog,”“greyhound”) they are then shown the picture of
an object, and they have to verify whether the object belong to the
category label. Lexical access is thus necessary and it is well known
that basic words are much more frequently used than superordi-
nate words. A large temporal cost in terms of word retrieval or
reference to lexical knowledge might therefore have masked the
superordinate advantage when object processing is largely visual.
Even when tasks have been carefully designed to try and differen-
tiate lexical access from visual categorization (Tanaka and Taylor,
1991; Tanaka and Curran, 2001), there is no evidence that partici-
pants do not need to use lexical information during the course of
the task, especially when target categories are changed from trial
to trial. This is reﬂected in the much longer RTs usually reported
for veriﬁcation and naming tasks when compared to fast visual
categorization in which subjects are required to take fast deci-
sions. Such temporal constraints may partly explain our results
(Rogers and Patterson, 2007). Moreover, the block procedure used
in fast visual categorization allows the maximal “presetting” of
the visual system for the task at hand. In such block procedures,
motor responses could also rely on unconscious object represen-
tations, as suggested by some of our results (Thorpe et al., 2001),
whereas activation of conscious representations might be needed
in naming and veriﬁcation tasks.
Another striking difference is the presentation time of the
stimuli since the 20-ms ﬂashed scenes used in ultra-rapid catego-
rization tasks might favor coarse-level visual information because
more ﬁne-grained visual information would be degraded. Two
points have to be emphasized. The ﬁrst one concerns the fact that
even if ﬂashed, the stimuli are unmasked so that retinal persis-
tence may be involved. Furthermore, even if information uptake is
limited to 20 ms, information processing would be less disrupted
than when strong masking is used. The duration of stimulus pre-
sentation might play a role, but recent – still unpublished – data
suggest that the superordinate advantage persists even with longer
stimulus presentation times.
Finally another difference concerns the stimuli used since most
studies use drawings or objects shown in isolation. It could be the
basic advantage is signiﬁcantly reduced when the objects to be cat-
egorized are embedded innatural scenes (Murphy andWisniewski,
1989).
For Jolicoeur et al. (1984),particular object category levelsmust
be mapped into a single (or small set) of representations in mem-
ory. Such mapping would depend upon perceptual characteristics
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(such as the object’s shape) and cognitive factors (such as con-
text) and would be faster at the entry level. But because the
visual system is shaped by experience, neuronal selectivities for
frequently encountered objects can be built progressively (Ahissar
and Hochstein, 2004; Masquelier et al., 2008). What I would like
to argue with others is that when such visually selective neurons
exist, object processing is automatic, and can reach implicit object
representation and bias behavior. Because of progressive integra-
tion of perceptual information over time, categorization levels are
reached from coarse to ﬁne, thus from superordinate to basic, and
subordinate categories.
HOW AUTOMATIC IS ACCESS TO BASIC CATEGORIES?
The responses produced in the fast go/no-go categorization
task could rely on early non-conscious object representations.
Indeed, numerous studies have argued that implicit processing
of objects can bias behavior and speed response production as
in patients with prosopagnosia or unilateral neglect for example
(De Haan et al., 1987; Driver and Vuilleumier, 2001; Forti and
Humphreys, 2007). Object perception can potentiate appropriate
actions toward that object (Grezes et al., 2003). One characteristic
of the fast visual categorization task at superordinate level is that
it can be performed in the near absence of attention. In 2002, two
different studies reached this conclusion. The ﬁrst one (Rousse-
let et al., 2002) showed that animal rapid categorization could be
performed in parallel when subjects had to process two natural
scenes ﬂashed simultaneously, the second study used a dual task
protocol, and showed that the animal and vehicle categorization
could be performed in periphery without performance cost when
attentional resources were fully engaged on the performance of a
central attentionally demanding task (Li et al., 2002). Other stud-
ies using dual tasks further extended this ﬁnding and showed that
gender categorization or even person identiﬁcation could be done
without focused attention (Reddy et al., 2004, 2006). Although the
parallel processing of natural scenes has a limit (Rousselet et al.,
2004; VanRullen et al., 2004), dual tasks can reveal which object
category can be processed preattentively in such scenes. In fact
VanRullen et al. (2004) proposed that the processing of “a feature,
stimulus,or object category is preattentive if there exists a neuronal
population selective to this feature, stimulus, or object category,
independent of the cortical area involved.”
Back to basic level object representations, the shift of response
latencies toward longer reaction time values might be explained
if the activation of these basic representations required attention.
However, using a dual task protocol, we have recently demon-
strated that even categorization at the basic level could be done
without focused attention for both biological (dogs) and for man
made (cars) objects (Poncet et al., 2011). Automatic processing of
objects can thus reach a ﬁne and detailed level of representation.
Such data could ﬁt with the reverse hierarchy theory (RHT) pro-
posed by Ahissar and colleagues (Ahissar and Hochstein, 2004;
Ahissar et al., 2009). Both categorization at the superordinate
and basic levels would have to be performed in the implicit
feed-forward wave of processing, using unconscious high-level
representations at the “top”of the visual hierarchy with no need of
the reverse hierarchy to low-level representations. It could be that
feed-back loops are needed to reach the basic category level when
contrasting a target category with a very similar non-target cate-
gory such as dogs and cats (Bowers and Jones, 2008) or to reach
subordinate category level.
Interestingly,when processing the peripheral photograph at the
basic level in the dual task, subjects require longer presentation
times of the natural scenes than when they are doing superordi-
nate categorization.Note that in such dual task paradigms both the
central and peripheral stimuli are masked to ensure that attention
cannot be switched from one task to another. Moreover SOA are
determined in isolation for the central and the peripheral task and
for each participant in order to set task accuracy at 75–80% when
participants are performing in the single task condition. As sug-
gested earlier, information processing and especially ﬁne-grained
processing, could be highly disrupted by the presence of a mask.
Finer, more detailed object representations appear to need more
time for information uptake and more integration of perceptual
information for selective neurons to ﬁre (Sugase et al., 1999). This
need for additional processing could be reﬂected in the 40- to 65-
ms delay found by Macé et al. (2009) between superordinate and
basic categorizations for both bird and dog targets.
FAST VISUAL PROCESSING AND “IN CONTEXT” OBJECT
REPRESENTATIONS
Whatever the level of categorization of a given object, when tasks
are using natural scenes as stimuli, the object is embedded within
a background context. In daily life certain objects tend to appear
in the same environment, simultaneously, or in close temporal
sequence (a hair dryer and a wash basin, a cow and a bush), others
on the contrary will seldom appear in the same circumstances (a
cow and a wash basin, a hair dryer and a bush). Feature or object
selective neurons are part of a large cerebral network in which
experience could also shape the strength of mutual interconnec-
tions. The visual system is very efﬁcient at extracting stimulus
regularities even at a conceptual level. Indeed, subjects can implic-
itly learn that in a streamof photographs of natural scenes, a bridge
is always followed by a bedroomand then by awaterfall (Brady and
Oliva, 2008) even though the scene exemplars are always different
and even though subjects are performing a task for which scene
category is completely irrelevant (responding to a back to-back
repeat of the same image). This sort of learning was seen when
subjects were asked to report what image would come next in the
sequence whether tested with images of the category or with writ-
ten category word. Thus, implicit learning of statistical regularities
can be seen at different level of perceptual abstraction, implying
that experience can set-up facilitatory, or inhibitory network con-
nections between populations of selective neurons depending on
how frequently (or not) they are coactivated in daily life. Thus
even with brieﬂy ﬂashed stimuli, the context in which objects are
presented could induce a performance beneﬁt (or cost) depending
on whether it is congruent or not with the object category assigned
as target (Figure 6).
However the strength of contextual inﬂuences on object pro-
cessing and even more the time course of these context/object
interactions are still very controversial. In the early 80s, Biederman
et al. (1982) showed that the frame of a scene object could interfere
with object detection.Detectionwas less accurate and slowerwhen
the object embedded in the scene violated different rules such as
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science October 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 243 | 8
Fabre-Thorpe The characteristics and limits of rapid visual categorization
FIGURE 6 | Along the ventral visual pathways, facilitatory/inhibitory
connections could develop with expertise between neurons selective
for objects or object features that are often/seldom coactivated in
daily life (illustration thanks to Maxime Cauchoix).
position, support, size, probability. . . a set of rules with which
painters such as Magritte have been playing with in their artwork.
But this hypothesis of a contextual inﬂuence on object processing
was later challenged by Hollingworth and Henderson (Holling-
worth and Henderson, 1998; Henderson and Hollingworth, 1999)
who reported that after eliminating guesses and response biases,
no advantage was found for the detection of consistent objects
over inconsistent ones. They proposed that object identiﬁcation
processes are isolated from knowledge about the world.
The inﬂuence of context is often seen as a top down inﬂu-
ence. When immersed in a given context, the representations of
objects that are likely to appear in such context might be pre-
activated by expectation (Bar and Ullman, 1996). However in fast
visual categorization, subjects are processing a succession of brieﬂy
ﬂashed scenes picturing very varied and unrelated scene gists. No
predictions can be made about the next photograph that will be
presented. Context and embedded objects have to be processed
from scratch in an ascending ﬂow of visual processing.
Recent studies (Davenport, 2007; Joubert et al., 2007, 2008)
have shown that, in the processing of brieﬂy ﬂashed scenes, when
expectations cannot be made, such interference can be demon-
strated. In fact, context can interfere with object processing but
reciprocally, salient objects can also inﬂuence the processing of
scene gists. The studies by Joubert et al. (2007, 2008) evalu-
ated such behavioral effects in terms of accuracy and response
speed. The presence of a salient object could delay scene catego-
rization (natural vs. urban) by 25–50 ms and even more if the
object is incongruent with the scene category, a ﬁnding replicated
later (Mack and Palmeri, 2010b). Conversely, when objects were
embedded in an incongruent context their categorization was less
accurate and their processing delayed. The contextual interference
on object processing could be seen even in the case of the ear-
liest behavioral responses since MinRT was delayed by 20–30 ms
with incongruent object/context associations. Thus, context can
modulate object processing even in its very early steps.
To explain such fast interference, a model proposed by Bar’s
(2004) group suggests that rapid coarse processing of a scene
would activate the most likely possible object(s) in a given contex-
tual frame. Activation of the ventral visual areas would be done
through the dorsal magnocellular pathway. As shown in Figure 6,
we would like to propose another model compatible with the
processing of a feed-forward processing wave within the ventral
pathway. Facilitation would occur when activated populations of
neurons selective for visual objects or features are normally used to
ﬁre together and have reinforced their interconnections. In other
situations activating populations of selective neurons that hardly
ﬁre simultaneously, conﬂicts may arise that can lead to delayed
visual processing. In the go–no go categorization task, it was not
possible to time the earliest effect of context on object processing
because even the earliest responses were affected. We have recently
been able to estimate this latency by using a forced choice saccade
based categorization task that gives access to an early temporal
window (Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006; Crouzet et al., 2010). When
this form of saccadic task is used with congruent and incongruent
stimulus associations, we found that context could interfere with
object processing at around 160 ms (Crouzet et al., 2009).
Using the animal go/no-go visual categorization task, the inﬂu-
ence of context on the ascending ﬂow of object information
processing has also been demonstrated in monkeys (Fize et al.,
2011). Sets of four congruent and incongruent achromatic stim-
uli (Figure 7) were used to prevent all biases possibly induced
by natural images. The monkeys’ experience is restricted to the
thousands of natural images they have been presented with for
task performance. Presumably, they must have extracted regular
object/context co-occurrences from such experience suggesting
that context is used in an implicit way. Although the subject
of controversy (Smyth and Shanks, 2008), the implicit use of
spatial conﬁguration has been reported in humans performing
visual search tasks (Chun and Jiang, 1998, 2003). Chun and Jiang
used a task in which certain targets systematically appeared in
consistent location within the global conﬁguration. Such targets
were detected faster than others embedded in new conﬁgura-
tions, but subjects were unable to explicitly discriminate new
from repeated stimulus conﬁgurations (Chun and Jiang, 1998)
or when asked to predict or generate the location of a miss-
ing target (Chun and Jiang, 2003). More recently as described
earlier, it was also shown that humans could implicitly learn
the temporal covariance of semantic categories of natural scenes
(Brady and Oliva, 2008) demonstrating that implicit learning
can also occur at a conceptual level. After learning, the global
features of a scene could be used to modulate the saliency
of the different regions of the scene in order for example, to
guide visual search to pertinent scene locations (Torralba et al.,
2006).
One interesting point in the Fize et al. (2011) paper is the fact
that a model only based on scene statistics (Oliva and Torralba,
2001) was at chance level when tested on the stimuli used in this
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FIGURE 7 | Four stimuli were built using two backgrounds (natural
and man made) and two object from different categories (animals
and man made objects) resulting in two congruent stimuli (one target
and one distracter) and two incongruent stimuli (one target and one
distracter). An example of the 192 sets of 4 stimuli that were used in Fize
et al. (2011).
study (Figure 7). The combination of global scene statistics with
the diffusion model of perceptual decision making (Ratcliff, 1978)
might have lead to bettermodel performance as suggested byMack
and Palmeri (2010b) for the categorization of scenes containing
incongruent objects.
The study by Joubert et al. (2008) was also the ﬁrst to dis-
entangle the performance impairments due to either stimulus
manipulation or object/context congruency. Indeed it showed that
pasting an object in another perfectly congruent context is far from
being without consequences on object categorization. Even when
ensuring that such stimulus manipulation does not violate certain
well-established rules (Biederman et al., 1982), it induces a drop
of categorization accuracy and response speed. Incidentally, one
of the interesting results reported in this study is that performance
in fast object categorization is no better for an isolated object
when compared to an object presented in its original context. An
unsolved question raised by this ﬁnding concerns the timing of
object segregation. In the ongoing debate about whether object
segregation has to precede recognition or whether object recogni-
tion inﬂuence the ﬁgure–ground segregation in brieﬂy presented
stimuli (Peterson and Gibson, 1994), our results are more in favor
of a late object segregation. Although we found no evidence that
scene categorization could be completed faster than object cate-
gorization (Joubert et al., 2007), an extreme view would suggest
that the visual system may be able to extract the global and eco-
logically relevant scene primitives needed to describe the spatial
lay-out of a scene and conceptual information without the need
to segment objects (Oliva and Torralba, 2006, 2007; Torralba et al.,
2006; Greene and Oliva, 2009).
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
For the last 15 years, fast go/no-go categorization tasks have thus
been useful in describing the characteristics of very early visual
processing. They have shown that the ﬁrst wave of feed-forward
processing can allowglobal coarse object and scene representations
at the superordinate category level from achromatic, probably
magnocellular, messages. But they also showed the limits of such
fast processing when tasks require more detailed object/scene rep-
resentations. They have demonstrated that early scene processing
is largely preattentive and automatic, relying on the regularities
of the surrounding world extracted by the visual system through
daily experience with no need to require prior object recogni-
tion but with processing time courses that are similar for objects
and scene gists. The processing of scenes appears massively paral-
lel with facilitatory/inhibitory modulations between object and
context processing. The use of the forced choice saccadic task
(Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006) will now allow the investigation of
an even earlier temporal window and provide new insights into
the mechanisms of early visual processing.
Although the processing of brieﬂy presented scenes is required
when ﬂipping through a magazine, when zapping from one TV
channel to another, and more and more required to follow mod-
ern video-clips, the use of brieﬂy ﬂashed stimuli is not usual in our
everyday life. Objects and scenes normally persist over time so that
information uptake is not restricted by stimulus presentation time.
Of course visual processing does not stop after the ﬁrst wave of
early visual processing that has been the focus of thepresent review.
Most daily visual tasks will require the development of attention,
the processing of ﬁner details and many feed-back and recurrent
processing loops to be solved. Nevertheless the fast visual catego-
rization task has proved very fruitful to investigate the efﬁciency of
the visual system in processing natural scenes under challenging
conditions, and at demonstrating the complexity of the tasks that
can be completed using only very early, mainly feed-forward and
automatic, processing of visual information.
One of the open questions concerns the shaping of object rep-
resentations by expertise and the temporal advantage offered by
expertise (Curby and Gauthier, 2009). Considering an expert as a
bird, dog, or car expert, one can predict that through experience,
such expert would have developed populations of neurons that are
visually selective to very detailed representations of corresponding
subordinate categories. The direct prediction that follows is that
automatic processing of visual information should be able to reach
subordinate level of categorization in expert without any atten-
tional need, whereas novices would be unable to perform the task
without attentional resources. Parallel processing of two simulta-
neously presented scenes would be a very good tool to tackle the
limits of preattentive object vision.
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